This paper studies the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a finite number of agents and a finite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem). I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between a subset of agents. I characterize the profiles of agent preferences when the Paretian set has cycles.
Introduction
The house allocation problem consists of the assignment of indivisible goods to a set of agents who can receive only one object in the final allocation. Such problems are very common: allocation of rooms between roommates, lectures between professors, offices between colleagues, etc.
This class of problems was introduced by [1] . For this paper, agents own all goods collectively. While authors prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium, [2] shows that this competitive equilibrium is unique when preferences are strict over the set of goods. Reference [3] proves that this unique solution can be implemented by a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. Furthermore, there is a unique strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal allocation mechanism leading to the unique core allocation [4] . Reference [5] shows the equivalence between the competitive allocation from random endowments and the random serial dictatorship while [6] proves that all mechanisms that are strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral must be serially dictatorial. Reference [7] models the case where there exists at the same time tenants and new comers on the same market. They introduce the top trading cycles mechanism in this set-up and show that it is Pareto efficient, individually rational and strategy-proof. Reference [8] introduces the possibility of having weak preferences over the set of goods and shows some restrictions on agent preferences for which efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible 1 .
The purpose of this paper is to look at rationalizability in the context of the house allocation problem. In other words, I am interested in answering the following questions: is it possible to say if, for a given set of allocations, there is a preference profile which supports this set as a Paretian allocation set? An example is students' seats in class. For every lecture, there is an allocation of seats. Considering the set of allocations, it is possible to test the rationality of students' preferences over seats by studying observed allocations.
In existing papers on the house allocation problem, only the [9] mentions explicitly the composition of the Paretian allocation set. They show that for any two allocations in the Paretian set, there exists a sequence of allocations belonging to the Paretian set such that they are pairwise connected, i.e. there are only two agents switching their goods and all others stay with the same good. This means that a set with two allocations that are not pairwise connected cannot be rationalized.
The main difficulty of using direct inference, i.e. testing each possible preference profile if it supports the allocation set as a Paretian allocation set, is linked to number of such preference profiles. As an example, if the number of goods is 5, then the number of possible allo-cations is 120 but the number of preference profiles is close to 25 billion 2 . Consequently, it seems reasonable to find a quickest method to study rationalizability.
In this paper, I introduce the concept of a cycle. A cycle is a subset of allocations in which a subset of agents switches their goods according to a specific scheme. The presence of cycles in a given set of allocations which is presumingly a Paretian set gives us information on the potential preference profiles which would support this set as a Paretian allocation set. With the concept of a cycle, I derive some conditions regarding the number of allocations that have to belong to an allocation set in order for it to be a Paretian allocation set.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the house allocation problem and I define the concept of a cycle. Section 4 talks about the properties of the cycle and Section 5 presents the implication of the presence of cycles in the Paretian allocation set. Section 6 concludes.
Definitions and Notations
denote the set of agents with   . The set of goods is 
denotes the set of all Paretian allocations when the profile is . Then, must be an element of which is the set of all non-empty subsets of
It is important to note here that, for all preference profiles , the set is never empty. This means that, for every preference profile , there is at least one allocation which is not Pareto dominated by another allocation. 
Cycles
Since direct inference is at least difficult, it seems natural to look at the structure of the Paretian set to identify some patterns that can be used to find one associated preference profile. Two groups of Paretian sets are trivially easy to rationalize. First, consider a Paretian set with only one allocation. Any preference profile where every agent has the allocated good as his most preferred good rationalizes this Paretian set. The second case is the other extreme case where the Paretian set is composed be all possible allocations. In such case, any preference profile where agents have the same preferences rationalizes this set. However, intermediate cases are more difficult to infer directly. To solve this problem, I propose the concept of cycle.
Definition 3: Let the set and 
It must be noted that
 
card R  is always higher or equal to 2 when  is higher or equal to 3. The number 1 and 1   always belong to R  . Since the number of ways to write the same cycle can be large 5 , I propose using the lexicographic ordering to have a unique notation for a given cycle. The first step is to choose from all possibilities of writing a given cycle the ways for which the vector is lexicographically dominated by (or equal to) the others. Secondly, from those variants, I choose the one for which the component subscripts of 
o r 3 All proofs are in Appendix. 4 For ,
, then we can write the same cycle in 200 different ways. 
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To know if the cycle   , C n x   has subcycles, I study the set R   . The next lemma tells us the condition nec-
Example 3: Suppose a set has the cycle S
, , , with and , , ,
The last definition about cycles is the following: Definition 6: The set has a complete cycle
In other words, the set has a complete cycle T   
Properties of Cycles and Complete Cycles
The presence of a cycle   , C n x   in a Paretian set   PO P gives information about the preferences of agents. The first insight given by a cycle is about pairs of goods which are neighbors in the vector x  .
. Consequently, if the Paretian set has a cycle, then all agents belonging to the cycle have same preferences over any pairs of neighbor goods in that cycle. With this proposition, some information on the associated profile is provided by the presence of a cycle in the Paretian set. However, information on preferences is only over each pair
No information about the preferences over all pairs of goods belonging to the set can be extracted from the cycle. The following example demonstrates the problem. Then when the good 3 x is allocated to someone who belongs to   1, 3 , the good 1 x is allocated to the other agent in that set. The cycle does not contain an allocation where the good 1 x is allocated to someone in  
Let's apply this proposition to the following example. , , , x x . This result gives additional information about the profile since it provides information on preferences over pairs of goods which are not neighbors in the cycle. Subcycles can be analyzed on their own since they are themselves distinct cycles, but they could be supported by different preference profiles across agents than the larger cycle. However, by using subcycles, it is only possible to show that agents which are neighbors in a subcycle have the same preferences over all pairs of goods which are neighbor in this subcycle and it is possible that two distinct subsets of agents in the cycle hold different preferences over the same subset of goods.
P
While Proposition 2 gives us information about preferences over pairs of goods that are neighbors in a subcycle, Proposition 3 deals with the other pairs.
Proposition 3: Suppose that has a cycle
It must be noted that if   is a prime number, all pairs of goods are treated by Proposition 3 since
. In this case, all agents in have the same preferences over the set .
This result is very strong. Only one cycle is enough to conclude that a subset of agents have the same preferences over a subset of goods. Unfortunately, as showed above, this result cannot be extended to any number of individuals in . N  Another case can lead to the conclusion that agents in a subset of have the same preferences over a subset of goods.
N

Proposition 4:
If has a complete cycle
, the agents in have the same preferences N  over . The presence of a complete cycle gives us more information about agent preferences. In fact, a cycle could give the same information if the number of elements in that cycle is a prime number. Unless it has this characteristic, a cycle by itself does not give information on preferences over all goods. But, if a single cycle cannot give the same information than a complete cycle, many cycles can provide it.
Proposition 5: Let the set be a subset of and a subset of
 be the lowest prime number such that
cycles with same  n  and same , then the agents in have the same preferences over . . But the subset of in which allocations give 5 
 
PO P x to agent 5 and 6 x to agent 6 does not contain the cycle   , C n x   . This is also true for the subset of in which allocations give
x to agent 5 and 5 x to agent 6. Example 6 shows that the existence of such an elements is not guaranteed. Nevertheless if such element exists and the agents in have the same preferences over the set , then the Paretian set contains a complete cycle
Proposition 6: Let the set be a subset of and a subset of 
Cycles and Paretian Sets
Finding a preference profile that rationalizes a set is easy in some cases. When
, then any preference profile such that agents have same preferences rationalizes the set has a Paretian set. Also, if the set has only one allocation , this set can be rationalized by any preference profile in which each agent gets his most preferred good. Even in the case where has two allocations, this set can be rationalized if the two allocations are pairwise connected. However, it is not possible to go further. At the first look, it is impossible to say if a set can be rationalized even if all allocations are pairwise connected 6 .
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Fortunately, it is possible to find some necessary conditions on rationalizable sets. Before presenting some conditions on rationalizable sets, I need the following proposition. 
Using Proposition 8, it is possible to know if a set cannot be rationalized just by looking to the number of allocations belonging to this set. If
, then there exists no preference profile such that
 
S PO P  . But, the reverse is not true. This is a necessary condition. Furthermore, it is possible to use cycles to find other intervals such that, if the number of allocations of a set belongs to those intervals, then this set cannot be rationalized. However, it is not possible to find a general form for all of those intervals.
Conclusions
The rationalizability in the context of house allocation is hard to provide. Except in cases where there are only a few allocations (1, 2 or 3) or for extreme cases (the set of all possible allocations or for singleton), it is very difficult to conclude. The use of cycles can help to analyze the rationalizability of an allocation set.
While Proposition 8 studies the number of elements necessary for an allocation set to be rationalizable, Proposition 6 presents a case where the fact that a set contains a cycle implies that it must contain some specific allocations too. Proposition 8 could be extended to include more conditions, but to devise a complete statement of all cases promises to be very long and complicated. From my point of view, the most interesting ave- 6 For example, consider the set 1  2  3  4  2  1  3  4  1  2  4  3 , , , , , , , , , , ,
. All allocations are pairwise connected but this set cannot be rationalized.
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Open Access TEL 346 nue for the use of cycles is to employ them like I do in Proposition 6. In short, cycles can be useful to study directly the rationalizability of an allocation set, since by using cycles, it is possible to say if a given allocation set is missing some allocations to be rationalizable. , , , 
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